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Abstract
Introducing a concept of fairness of economic allocations, namely exploitation as the unequal
exchange of labor (henceforth, UE exploitation) by generalizing Roemer’s [51, 52] seminal model,
this paper aims to answer the following two questions in the context of an intertemporal economy
with linear technology: How is income and wealth inequality related (or unrelated) to the
existence and persistence of UE exploitation? What are the mechanisms driving the persistent
existence of UE exploitation in growing economies? Agents are UE exploited (resp. exploiters)
if the amount of labor that they contribute to the economy is smaller (resp. bigger) than the
amount of labor ‘received’ by them via their income. It is proved, first, that UE exploitation is
monotonically correlated to functional income inequality. Second, it is shown that, unless agents
discount the future, asset inequalities are necessary, but not sufficient for the persistence of UE
exploitation, and the capital accumulation leading to the disappearance of UE exploitation
cannot be ruled out in equilibrium. Third, it is shown that, regardless of whether agents
discount the future, labor-saving technical progress may yield sustained growth with persistent
UE exploitation by keeping labor abundant relative to capital, which restrains wages from
rising. Unlike in models with differentiable production functions, this mechanism does not rely
on changes in the marginal productivity of inputs and it is entirely driven by the interaction
between innovation and labor markets.
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1 Introduction
Recently, a vast literature has analyzed the persistent, and widening, inequalities in income and
wealth observed in the vast majority of nations.1 Less attention has been devoted to a specific
form of inequality related to the systematic underpayment of labor in relation to their contribution
to production, which is known as exploitation and has normative implications. Two questions
immediately arise. First, what is the relation between inequalities in income and/or wealth, and
the existence and persistence of exploitation? Second, what are the mechanisms that drive the
existence, and persistence, of exploitation in growing economies?
The answers to these questions are not obvious, and depend on the concept of exploitation
adopted.2 This paper adopts a specific concept of exploitation, namely exploitation as the unequal
exchange of labor (henceforth, UE exploitation), and analyzes the relation between inequalities
in income and/or wealth, and the existence and persistence of UE exploitation by focusing on
linear economies.3 The basic intuition of UE exploitation can be traced back to Aristotle and Karl
Marx,4 but its modern, rigorous formulation is due to John Roemer [50, 52, 53]: an agent is UE
exploited (resp. exploiting) if the amount of labor she contributes to the economy (e.g., the labor
she expends in productive activities) is higher (resp. lower) than the amount of labor she ‘receives’
via her income (e.g. the labor contained in the consumption bundle she can purchase). As Roemer
([53], p. 168) emphasized, this kind of disproportional distribution of labor and national income is
indeed worth calling exploitative under the differential ownership of productive assets.
To see this, consider a simple perfectly competitive economy with only two agents, ν,μ with
the same preferences and the same skills. If agent ν is wealthy and therefore can optimize without
working, while agent μ has very little capital and needs to work for μ, then “[p]roducer ν is
exploiting μ. This comes about because . . . ν is wealthier than μ, and is able to use his wealth as
leverage through the exchange mechanism to force μ to work “for” him. . . . That this phenomenon
deserves to be called [UE] exploitation can be seen by the following. Suppose . . . ν expropriated
μ’s endowment and killed him. Producer ν would now be wealthier than before; yet, . . . for the
new economy in which only he is a member, he will have to work . . . longer than when μ was there.
Thus, exploitation is an explicitly social phenomenon: ν can get away with working less . . . only
because there is someone else working more . . . , to “support” him. Producer ν appears to be
gaining at the expense of μ, . . . even though all producers gain from trade” (Roemer [53], p.168).
This last argument also makes the concept of UE exploitation distinct from those of the other
forms of inequalities. Indeed, if these agents engaged in their autarkic economic activities and
developed no division of labor between them, income and wealth inequalities would be still observed
due to the differential ownership of productive assets, but there is no UE exploitation in such a
case.
The concept of UE exploitation also directs our attention to the joint distribution of income
1For example see [44].
2One example of such a concept is of “neoclassical exploitation” which can be traced back to Arthur Pigou [43] and
Joan Robinson [49], according to which exploitation occurs when the rental price of a productive input is not equal to
its marginal product. Therefore, exploitative relations arise from competitive distortions and so exploitation persists
for as long as such distortions persist. Thus, first, if marginal product pricing obtains, then voluntary transactions
in factor markets are automatically fair, whatever the background conditions of (and the final income distribution
resulting from) such trades. Second, and more important, exploitation cannot be diagnosed (and therefore the concept
has no bite) whenever the marginal product of a factor of production cannot be defined. In particular, the concept
cannot be used in the large, and theoretically relevant set of linear economies, in which all income distributions are
definitionally, and rather counterintuitively, nonexploitative.
3The focus on linear economies is empirically in line with recent evidence casting doubts on the degree of substi-
tutability between labor and capital, and showing some limitations of marginal productivity theory as an explanation
of the remuneration of productive inputs (Foley and Michl [17]; Basu [8]).
4For a discussion, see Roemer [52], Maniquet [34], and Yoshihara and Veneziani [69]. The concept of UE ex-
ploitation is also related to the so-called “proportional solution” and the notion of Kantian equilibrium (Roemer and
Silvestre [56]; Moulin [39]; Roemer [55]).
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and labor/leisure in the economy, which is also relevant information for the modern theory of
distributive justice. Indeed, as Fleurbaey [16] has argued, UE exploitation can be linked with the
issue of inequalities in the distribution of material well-being purchasable via income (ex. goods,
services, etc.) and free hours (leisure time) discussed in the theory of distributive justice. For
instance, they are relevant for inequalities of well-being freedom5 (Rawls [48]; Sen [57]), because
material well-being and free hours are key determinants of individual well-being freedom.
Given these distinctive features of the concept of UE exploitation, the first question raised at
the head of this section is important in order to understand whether analyses of income and wealth
inequalities provide exhaustive information about the unfairness of competitive economies. If this
was not the case, then policies that alleviate inequalities would not necessarily reduce, and might
even increase, other forms of unfairness, such as UE exploitation.
The relation between growth and UE exploitation is also unclear, and equally relevant from
both a theoretical and a policy perspective. Does growth tend to reduce, or worsen, exploitative
relations? What are the mechanisms that guarantee the persistence of UE exploitation?
In this paper, we address these issues and analyze the relation between wealth inequalities, prof-
its, accumulation and UE exploitation in a dynamic general equilibrium model with heterogeneous
optimizing agents which generalizes Roemer’s [50, 52, 53] economies. To be specific, we assume that
there exist two types of agents in the economy, capitalists and workers. Both types of agents have
the same preferences over consumption bundles and solve an intertemporal optimization program.
They also have the same skills and labor endowments. However, we allow for inequalities in their
endowments of productive assets, which have some major behavioral implications.
Capitalists own wealth which allows them to hire workers and activate production processes
by using a linear technology. They do not work and allocate their income optimally between
consumption and savings. In contrast, workers own no wealth and their only source of income is
their labor. Although, like capitalists, they choose consumption bundles to maximize utility, we
assume that they cannot accumulate. This assumption is consistent with two other key features of
our model, namely the existence of wealth constraints and the incompleteness of credit markets,6
whose importance has long been emphasized in the literature.7 It is also in line with standard
models in the tradition of Classical economics (see Roemer [50], p.509), and with more recent
analyses of the effect of wealth inequality and credit constraints on macroeconomic dynamics (see,
most notably, Kaplan and Violante [26] and Krueger et al [29]).8
In this economy, we rigorously define the concept of UE exploitation (Definition 3): agents
suffer from an unequal exchange of labor if the amount of labor they contribute to the economy is
higher than the amount of labor necessary to produce a consumption bundle purchased by their
income. We show that in equilibrium, the profitability of capitalist production is synonymous with
the existence of UE exploitation and a monotonic relation exists between the profit rate9 and the
exploitation rate (Theorem 1). This result is important because the rate of profit is one of the key
determinants of investment decisions, and of the long-run dynamics of capitalist economies. Thus,
5The notion of well-being freedom emphasizes an individual’s ability to pursue the life she values.
6 In economies with wealth constraints, the availability of production loans is a necessary condition for asset-poor
agents to be able to undertake production activities and obtain nonzero and nonegligible wealth levels in equilibrium
(Banerjee and Newman [6]).
7See, for example, the classic papers by Loury [31]; Galor and Zeira [18]; Bénabou [10]; and Matsuyama [35]).
8Empirically, this assumption is consistent with recent findings by Krueger et al [29] who report higher consumption
rates for agents with lower net worth. It can also be justified noting the extreme, and persistent, wealth inequalities
in advanced economies, with the bottom quintiles of the wealth distribution owning zero net worth (Allegretto [4];
Piketty [44]; Krueger et al [29]), and with remarkably (and perhaps surprisingly) low and declining degree of social
mobility (Greenstone et al [21]). This is true even if one considers the very long run (Barone and Mocetti [7]) and
without major differences between European countries and the US (Bénabou and Tirole [11], pp.702ff).
9We define ‘profits’ as all incomes other than incomes from labor, or ‘unearned incomes’ as they are sometimes
called, and the rate of profit is the ratio of unearned incomes over the value of the capital employed in production
(see Malinvaud ([32], pp.254-255).
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Theorem 1 can be interpreted as providing a link between inequality, exploitation, and growth: in
an economy where only capitalists invest, more exploitation implies a higher profit rate and thus
more funds for accumulation. But the result is important also because it proves that, given private
ownership of productive assets, profits are a counterpart of the transfer of social surplus and social
labor from asset-poor agents to the wealthy. This provides a link between UE exploitation and the
functional income distribution. This result confirms the relevance of the concept of UE exploitation
in examining the dynamics of capitalist economies, and it provides the foundations for the rest of
the analysis.
We then derive a number of results concerning the relation between inequality, UE exploitation,
and growth. First, in the basic economy with constant labor supply and a given technology,
there exists no equilibrium path with persistent growth and persistent UE exploitation even in
the presence of significant asset inequalities (Proposition 1): absent any countervailing measures,
accumulation leads capital to become abundant, and profits and exploitation to disappear. Second,
and perhaps more surprising, asset inequalities and competitive markets alone do not guarantee
the persistence of profits and UE exploitation, even in equilibrium paths without accumulation in
which capital does not become abundant. Neither at stable growth paths converging to a long-run
steady state, nor at stationary states without accumulation, is UE exploitation a persistent feature
of the economy, unless agents discount the future (Theorems 3 and 4). Finally, Theorem 7 proves
that in the long-run labor-saving technical progress may yield sustained growth with persistent
exploitation and inequalities by reducing the demand for labor, thus creating the conditions for an
excess supply of labor, which restrains wages from rising.10
These results correspond to the question of the mechanisms driving the persistent existence of
UE exploitation in growing economies. First, a part of them sheds light on the role of time preference
in this question. If the discount factor of agents is unity, then inequalities, UE exploitation, and
profits may well disappear after a finite number of periods, even if capital remains scarce (Theorem
3 and Theorem 4). Instead, if agents discount the future, inequalities and UE exploitation can be
persistent even in paths with capital accumulation (Theorem 4). Furthermore, the steady state
value of the profit rate (and thus, by Theorem 1, the rate of UE exploitation) is a positive function
of the discount factor whenever it is less than unity. In contrast, overaccumulation leading to the
disappearance of UE exploitation cannot be ruled out in equilibrium unless the discount factor is
less than unity (Proposition 2). These results also suggest that the analysis of UE exploitation
cannot be reduced to the analysis of wealth inequalities, as discussed in more detail at sections 5
and 6 later.
Given these results, one may argue that, along equilibrium paths where capital remains scarce,
a positive rate of time preference by capitalists is all that is needed, in addition to differential
ownership of (scarce) productive assets and competitive markets, to guarantee the persistence of
factor income inequalities and UE exploitation. Although this is certainly a legitimate interpreta-
tion of Theorems 3 and 4, we do not think that it is the most insightful or normatively robust. On
the one hand, in our view, one of the distinguishing features of exploitation theory is an emphasis
on the structural, objective characteristics of capitalist economies, rather than on subjective and
empirically contingent factors such as time preference.
On the other hand, our results point to an alternative, more structural explanation of the
persistence of inequalities and UE exploitation. In particular, Theorem 7 suggests that the central
role of asset inequalities is better understood in conjunction with labor market conditions and
institutions, and the mechanisms that ensure the scarcity of capital. It provides an alternative
explanation of the persistence of UE exploitation focusing on the interaction between technical
change and labor market conditions in shaping distributive outcomes and the equilibrium growth
paths of capitalist economies.11 By raising labor productivity, labor-saving technical progress
10For a discussion of the role of technical change and a review of the literature, see Tavani and Zamparelli [61].
11This conclusion is similar in spirit to the main findings of Banerjee and Newman [5] where persistent inequalities
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ensures the persistent abundance of labor, which in turn keeps wages low and guarantees the
profitability conditions necessary for growth. Further, as the wage rate and employment remain
relatively stagnant while the economy grows, the interaction between labor market conditions and
technical progress leads the wage share in national income to fall steadily over time, as has been
observed in most advanced countries in the last few decades (Karabarbounis and Neiman [27];
Piketty and Zucman [45]).
Compared with the recent macroeconomic literature exploring the emergence and persistence
of inequality, our approach with a linear production technology is distinctive, in that it allows us to
examine some relatively unexplored mechanisms through which inequality affects growth, and vice
versa. In economies with credit constraints and standard production functions with diminishing
marginal productivity, for example, inequality tends to reduce growth because poorer agents cannot
access production loans and therefore cannot invest in projects yielding higher returns (see Bénabou
[10]; Matsuyama [35]; and the literature therein). Conversely, one of the main channels through
which growth affects inequality is via the effect of accumulation on the dynamics of the marginal
productivity of capital and labor. In our model, we analyze the relation between inequality and
growth abstracting from any consideration concerning marginal productivity, while focusing on the
role of labor market conditions and technical change.
Further, while technical change and capital accumulation are also central in Acemoglu [1, 2, 3],
they play a different role in their interaction with labor market conditions. Innovations, in our
model, do not allow for persistent growth by affecting total factor productivity, or via their direct
effect on output per worker, and they do not influence the functional distribution of income by
altering marginal productivity. Rather, labor-saving technical change allows UE exploitation and
inequalities to persist by constantly creating an excess supply of labor that weakens the workers’
position in the labor market and drives wages down.
2 Related Literature
This paper lies at the intersection of various strands of literature.
Roemer’s [50, 52, 53] seminal contributions have sparked a vast debate. Several critiques have
been expounded on his methodology and conclusions, mainly based on exegetical issues, but sur-
prisingly little attention has been devoted to his models (Veneziani [62]). In this paper, we take
a different approach and critically evaluate Roemer’s theory using a dynamic general equilibrium
model. For, as Veneziani [62] has argued, Roemer’s [50, 52, 53] models are essentially static in that
agents face no intertemporal trade-offs. As a result, they are not suitable to analyze exploitation
and inequalities as persistent features of capitalist economies. Nor do they allow to analyze the
relation between exploitation, inequality and accumulation.
This paper analyzes the conditions both for the emergence and for the persistence of exploita-
tion, and the relation between asset inequalities, exploitation, profits and growth, in a dynamic
generalization of Roemer’s [50, 52, 53] economies with optimizing agents. This allows us to assess
the causal and moral relevance of asset inequalities in generating exploitation as a persistent feature
of a capitalist economy where (a subset of) agents can save.
Our approach is reminiscent of earlier contributions by Devine and Dymski [14] and Hahnel
[22], who have showed that if Roemer’s [52] static model is allowed to run for many periods, capital
accumulation eventually drives profits to zero. However, unlike in this paper, they focused on the
T -fold iteration of the static model with myopic agents, without explicitly analyzing intertemporal
decisions. Moreover, they did not explicitly consider the possible determinants of the persistence of
exploitation and inequalities. Some of our conclusions echo the results obtained in Veneziani [62].
However, the latter contributions focus on simple subsistence economies with a given technology,
derive from the interaction between labor market conditions and wealth constraints in a model of occupational choice.
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and therefore can only shed partial light on the determinants of exploitation and on the link between
exploitation and growth.
The model incorporates a number of assumptions — most notably, concerning labor, technology,
savings, and technical change — that can be traced back to the Classical economists, and that allow
us “to focus on the effect of ongoing capital accumulation per se on the long run distribution of
income between capital and labor” (Mookherjee and Ray [36], p.2). These assumptions have been
formalized in some classic papers, such as Kaldor [24] and Pasinetti [41], which focused on the effect
of income distribution on consumption and saving and sparked a vast debate (more recent work
includes Bohm and Kaas [13] and Patriarca and Vona [42]). Unlike in these earlier contributions,
however, we explicitly model micro behavior and intertemporal trade-offs.
There is a vast literature analyzing the effect of inequality on growth focusing on electoral
competition and political economy (Bénabou [10]; Ray and Esteban [46]): in these contributions,
inequality tends to have a detrimental effect on growth as it generates social conflict and insecure
property rights, but “what really matters is not income inequality per se but inequality in the
relative distribution of earning and political power” (Bénabou [10], p.18): a higher degree of pro-
wealth bias in the political system tends to help growth. We abstract from political economy issues
and in our model the role of capitalists in fostering accumulation implies that inequality always has
beneficial effects on growth, consistent with standard insights in Classical economics.
Our results relate to a literature that explores the emergence and persistence of inequality,
including human capital and nonconvexities (Galor and Zeira [18]; Galor and Tsiddon [19]), en-
dogenous risk-taking or idiosyncratic and uninsurable unemployment risk (Becker, Murphy, and
Werning [9]; Ray and Robson [47]; Krueger et al [29]), and aspirational preferences (Genicot and
Ray [20]). Yet our analysis is conceptually closer to contributions taking a more structural perspec-
tive and emphasizing the role of incomplete markets, credit constraints, and institutions (Loury [31];
Banerjee and Newman [5]; Matsuyama [35]), and the interaction between labor market conditions
and technical change (Acemoglu [1, 2, 3]).
Compared with the literature just mentioned, our approach is distinctive given the focus on
UE exploitation and on the relation between exploitation and the functional income distribution.
In this respect, our paper is closer to the growing literature analysing the recent trend decline
in the labor share both in the U.S. and globally, focusing on technical change and automation
(Karabarbounis and Neiman [27]; Mookherjee and Ray [36]) or capital accumulation (Piketty [44];
Piketty and Zucman [45]). Although technical change and capital accumulation are central in our
model, they play a different role in their interaction with labor market conditions. Thus, unlike in
Karabarbounis and Neiman [27] and Mookherjee and Ray [36], innovations and accumulation do
not affect distribution via their effect on the relative price of investment goods. Unlike in Piketty
[44] and Piketty and Zucman [45], capital accumulation does not have a negative effect on the wage
share and indeed when the conditions for long run accumulation are satisfied the growth rate of
the economy is equal to the profit rate.
Our model also relates to the literature on the generic indeterminacy of the functional income
distribution in perfectly competitive economies with a linear technology (Mandler [33] and Yoshi-
hara and Kwak [70]). By proving the monotonic relation between UE exploitation and profits
in Theorem 1, our paper suggests that exploitative relations between capitalists and workers may
serve as a selection mechanism to identify an equilibrium factor income distribution, thus providing
the foundations for an alternative to marginal productivity theory.
Finally, Theorem 1 proves that profits are synonymous with UE exploitation. The existence
of a relation between exploitation and profits has a “prominent place in the modern formulation
of Marxian economics” (Roemer [51], p.16), and therefore it has been dubbed the ‘Fundamental
Marxian Theorem’ (FMT; Morishima [38]). The FMT has generated an extensive literature (see,
e.g., the seminal contributions by Okishio [40] and Morishima [38]).12 Nonetheless, the robustness
12For a counterpoint on the normative relevance of the FMT and an alternative explanation of the origins of profits,
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and theoretical relevance of the FMT have been put into question: according to critics, the FMT
holds only under very restrictive assumptions concerning preferences, endowments, and technology
and, in any case, the relation between exploitation and profits is spurious, as the FMT simply
captures the productivity of the economy (for a comprehensive discussion, see Yoshihara [67]).
Yoshihara and Veneziani [63, 64] have recently shown that, contrary to the critics’ claims,
the main insights of the FMT continue to hold in static economies with general technologies and
preferences. In this paper, we explicitly tackle the relation between exploitation, profits and growth,
and provide a dynamic generalization of the FMT in a model with maximizing agents.
3 The Model
The economy consists of a sequence of non-overlapping generations. In each generation there is
a set Nc = {1, . . . , Nc} of capitalists with generic element ν, and a set Nw = {1, . . . , Nw} of
workers with generic element η. Agents live for T periods and are indexed by the date of birth kT ,
k = 0, 1, 2, . . . , kT. 13 In every period t, they produce and exchange n commodities and labor. Let
(pt, wt) denote the 1× (n+ 1) price vector in t, where wt is the nominal wage.14
We analyze the consequences of wealth inequalities in economies with incomplete capital mar-
kets, and model differences in behavior starkly. Let 0 be the null vector. In every t, each capitalist
ν ∈ Nc owns a n× 1 vector of productive assets ωνt = 0,15 where ωνkT ≥ 0 is the vector of endow-
ments inherited, when born in kT . In every t, capitalists do not work but can hire workers in order
to operate any activity of a standard Leontief technology (A,L), where A is a n× n non-negative,
productive and indecomposable matrix of material input coefficients and L > 0 is a 1×n vector of
direct labor coefficients.16 For every ν, yνt is the n× 1 vector of activity levels that ν hires workers
to operate at t.
Following Roemer [50, 52, 53], production takes time and capitalists must lay out in advance the
capital necessary to finance production. However, agents cannot access credit markets to finance
either production or accumulation.17 Formally, in every t each capitalist ν has to use her wealth,
ptω
ν
t , to obtain the necessary material inputs. At the end of the production period, capitalists use
their net income to pay workers and to finance consumption and accumulation. Thus, for each ν,
in every t, sνt is the n× 1 vector of savings and cνt = 0 is the n× 1 consumption vector.
The choices available to workers are much more limited. Each worker η ∈ Nw possesses no
physical capital, ω
η
t = 0 in every t, but is endowed with one unit of labor. Therefore workers
obtain income only by supplying labor and we assume that they use their income only to purchase
consumption goods.18 To be precise, at all t, z
η
t is η’s labor supply and c
η
t is η’s n× 1 consumption
see Hahnel [23].
13We focus on the empirically relevant case of economies with finite T . Both the model and our main conclusions,
however, can be extended to the case with infinite T , albeit at the cost of an increase in notational intensity.
14Throughout the paper, all variables and vectors are assumed to belong to a Euclidean space Rk of appropriate
dimensionality k.
15For all vectors x, y ∈ Rp, x = y if and only if xi = yi (i = 1, . . . , p); x ≥ y if and only if x = y and x 6= y; x > y
if and only if xi > yi (i = 1, . . . , p).
16 In the basic model, technology remains unchanged over time. We introduce technical progress in section 6 below.
The other assumptions on technology can also be relaxed, albeit at the cost of a significant increase in technicalities
(see, for example, the general convex cone economies analyzed in Veneziani and Yoshihara [65]).
17As in Patriarca and Vona [42] the economy displays intertemporal complementarities — whereby “production
takes time and is carried on in vertical integrated firms with fixed proportions of capital and labor” (Patriarca and
Vona [42], p.1643) — and markets open sequentially (produced inputs are bought before production takes place and
must be financed out of beginning-of-period asset holdings).
18Our assumptions on saving behavior yield no significant loss of generality, either theoretically or formally. The-
oretically, our aim is not to analyze social mobility, nor are we trying to explain earning inequalities arising from
heterogeneous labor and skills. Formally, none of our key conclusions depends on ruling out workers’ accumulation.
In fact, the inclusion of workers’ accumulation would strengthen our results on the transitory nature of inequalities
in the basic economy without technical progress. Further, as shown below, along any equilibrium paths with accu-
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vector. Furthermore, the (work and consumption) choices available to workers are limited by the
structural features of the economy and in particular by the presence of unemployment. Formally,
for all η ∈ Nw, in every t, there exists an upper bound bzηt to η’s labor supply, which is determined
by demand conditions.
We assume that, at all t, cνt = 0 for all ν ∈ Nc, while there exists a reference consumption
bundle b > 0, such that cηt = b, for all η ∈ Nw. Unlike capitalists, workers perform labor and need
a minimum amount of consumption in return.19 This incorporates the idea that capitalists are not
essential in production and, together with the assumption that ω
η
t = 0, for all η ∈ Nw and all t, it
starkly outlines differences between workers and capitalists.20
Although some aspects of behavior are determined by socio-economic status, we rule out het-
erogeneity in preferences over consumption. Formally, there is a continuous, strictly increasing,
strictly quasi-concave, and homogeneous of degree one function φ : Rn+ → R+, such that φ(cht )
describes agent h’s welfare at t, where h = ν, η, and we normalize φ by assuming that φ(cht ) = 0
whenever chit = 0 for some good i.
Credit markets are incomplete and there is no intertemporal trade between agents.21 This is
consistent with the lack of a pure accumulation motive — that is, the desire to maximize capital
accumulation per se, which is often assumed in Marxist models (e.g., Morishima [37]; Roemer [51]).
In our model, capitalists do not aim to maximize accumulation of capital per se, and production
does not take place for production’s own sake. However, Roemer’s [50, 52, 53] static economies are
generalized by allowing for intertemporal trade-offs during an agent’s life.
Let (p,w) = {pt, wt}t=kT,...,(k+1)T−1 denote the path of the price vector during the lifetime of
a generation. Let yν = {yνt }t=kT,...,(k+1)T−1 denote ν’s lifetime plan of activity levels and let a
similar notation hold for cν , sν , ων , zη, and cη. As a shorthand notation, let “all t” stand for “all
t, t = kT, . . . , (k + 1)T − 1.” Let 0 < β 5 1 be the discount factor. Capitalist ν is assumed to
choose ξν = (yν , cν , sν) to maximize lifetime welfare subject to the constraint that (1) net revenues
(profits) are sufficient for consumption and savings, all t; (2) wealth is sufficient for production
plans, all t; (3) the dynamics of assets is determined by savings, all t; and (4) ν’s descendants
receive at least as many resources as she inherited. Formally, agent ν ∈ Nc solves the following
maximization program (MP ν), whose value is denoted as C(ωνkT ).
MP ν : C(ωνkT ) = max
ξν
(k+1)T−1X
t=kT
βtφ (cνt ) ,
subject to
[pt (I −A)− wtL] yνt = ptcνt + ptsνt , (1)
ptAy
ν
t 5 ptωνt , (2)
ωνt+1 = ω
ν
t + s
ν
t , (3)
ων(k+1)T = ωνkT , (4)
yνt = 0,ωνt = 0, cνt = 0.
mulation, workers do not save, due to the downward pressure exercized by unemployment on the real wage. (This is
reminiscent of a feature of the model by Banerjee and Newman ([5], p.291), whereby the abundance of labor drives
the wage down which “makes it virtually impossible ... for workers to accumulate enough wealth".)
19The reference vector b does not identify a physical subsistence bundle. Rather, we interpret it as a socially-
determined basic consumption standard which must be reached in order for workers to supply labor in the capitalist
sector (Banerjee and Newman [5]). We assume b to be constant over time, but the model can be generalized to
incorporate a time-varying bt reflecting evolving social norms, culture, and so on.
20 In a less schematic model, if profits fall below some threshold, capitalists would start to work.
21As already noted, credit markets are also incomplete in the sense that, within each period, agents cannot activate
production with external finance. As Roemer [50, 52, 53] has shown, however, this assumption yields no significant
loss of generality.
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Similarly, worker η ∈ Nw chooses ξη = (zη, cη) to maximize welfare subject to the constraint that
at all t: (5) revenues are sufficient for η’s consumption; and (6) subsistence is reached. Furthermore,
at all t, (7) workers’ labor supply is constrained both by their labor endowment and by labor market
conditions, as captured by the (from the individual’s viewpoint) exogenously given parameter bzηt .
Formally, agent η ∈ Nw solves the following maximization program (MP η).
MP η: max
ξη
(k+1)T−1X
t=kT
βtφ (cηt ) ,
subject to
wtz
η
t = ptc
η
t , (5)
c
η
t = b, (6)
min [1, bzηt ] = zηt = 0. (7)
The optimization programs MP ν and MP η allow us to investigate the relation between wealth
inequalities, growth, and exploitation in a dynamic context. Given the absence of capital markets
and of any explicit bequest motive,22 they are a natural generalization of Roemer’s [50, 52, 53]
static profit or revenue maximization programs.
Let ΩkT =
³
ω1kT ,ω
2
kT , ...,ω
Nc
kT
´
. Let E ((Nc,Nw) , (A,L) ,ΩkT , (β,φ)), or as a shorthand nota-
tion EkT , denote the economy with population (Nc,Nw), technology (A,L), endowments ΩkT , dis-
count factor β and welfare function φ. At all t, let yt =
P
ν∈Nc y
ν
t , c
c
t =
P
ν∈Nc c
ν
t , ωt =
P
ν∈Nc ω
ν
t ,
st =
P
ν∈Nc s
ν
t , c
w
t =
P
η∈Nw c
η
t , and zt =
P
η∈Nw z
η
t . Following Roemer [50, 52, 53], the equilibrium
concept can now be defined.23
Definition 1: A reproducible solution (RS) for EkT is a price vector (p,w) and an associated set
of actions ((ξν)ν∈Nc , (ξ
η)η∈Nw) such that:
(i) ξν solves MP ν for all ν ∈ Nc;
(ii) ξη solves MP η for all η ∈ Nw;
(iii) yt = Ayt + cct + cwt + st, for all t;
(iv) Ayt 5 ωt, for all t;
(v) Lyt = zt, for all t;
(vi) ω(k+1)T = ωkT .
Conditions (i) and (ii) require agents to optimize given the individual and the aggregate constraints
limiting their choices; (iii) and (iv) require that there be enough resources for consumption and
saving plans, and for production plans, respectively, at all t; (v) states that the amount of labor
performed in the economy must be sufficient for production plans at all t; (vi) requires that resources
not be depleted by any given generation.
Definition 1 is an intertemporal extension of the concept of RS first defined by Roemer [50]
and it provides a general notion of Marxian equilibrium (Veneziani and Yoshihara [65]). It is
important to note that the concept of RS does not impose market clearing, and allows for an
aggregate excess supply of produced goods, and, crucially, labor.24 Thus, Definition 1(v) is an ex
post condition consistent with the existence of involuntary unemployment. For, although workers
22Though constraint 4 can also be interpreted as incorporating some sort of social norm on bequests.
23 If technical change occurs as described in section 6 below, then the economy is more precisely described as
E ((Nc,Nw) , (A,LkT , δ) ,ΩkT , (β,φ)) but everything else remains unchanged.
24This is consistent with the Classical economists’ emphasis on the conditions for the “reproducibility” of the
economic system, rather than market clearing. As Roemer ([50], p.507) put it, “The concern is with whether the
economic system can reproduce itself: whether it can produce enough output to replenish the inputs used, and to
reproduce the workers for another period of work.”
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choose their labor supply optimally and aggregate labor supply equals labor demand ex post, labor
market conditions act as a constraint on workers’ choices ex ante in condition (7). In fact, by the
monotonicity of φ, in our framework, the standard labor market clearing condition at t requires
Lyt = Nw, whereas involuntary unemployment occurs at t whenever Lyt = zt < Nw.
Therefore, we say that a RS is unconstrained if Lyt = zt = Nw, for all t, while a RS is constrained
at t0 if there exists some t0 such that Nw > zt0 = Lyt0 and wt0zt0 = Nwpt0b. Because workers are
identical, we assume that at a constrained RS, all of them work an equal amount of time which
allows them to reach subsistence. Given the absence of a subsistence sector and of the public sector,
this seems an appropriate way of capturing unemployment in this model. Moreover, we also focus
on the minimal wage rate in the case of involuntary unemployment.25 Thus, formally, if a RS is
constrained at t0, then bzηt0 = Lyt0Nw and cηt0 = b, all η ∈ Nw.
Given the focus on the persistence of exploitation and profits, the subset of RSs with stationary
capital will be of particular interest. A stationary reproducible solution (SRS) for EkT is a RS such
that, at all t, cνt = c
ν and sνt = 0, all ν ∈ Nc, and cηt = cη, all η ∈ Nw.
Definition 2 captures the idea of capital scarcity as requiring that the total supply of productive
assets is limited, relative to current demand at a given RS (p,w).26
Definition 2: Let (p,w) be a RS for EkT . The economy EkT is said to exhibit capital scarcity at
(p,w), in period t, if and only if ptAy
ν
t = ptω
ν
t , all ν ∈ Nc. If ptAyνt < ptωνt , some ν ∈ Nc, then
capital is said to be abundant at (p,w), in period t.
To be sure, Definition 2 is not the only possible way of defining capital scarcity. Yet it incor-
porates an intuitive and widespread notion of scarcity of productive factors that goes back, for
example, to Solow’s [60] classic analysis. For, as it will be shown below, by Definition 2, in the
linear economies considered in this paper, the economy exhibits capital scarcity when aggregate
capital is insufficient to guarantee the full employment of the labor force, i.e. when it is “capital
limited” in Roemer’s [52] sense. However, as in Solow’s ([60], pp.83-84) analysis of linear economies,
by Definition 2 an economy may also exhibit capital scarcity when aggregate endowments are such
as to allow for the full employment of both capital and labor, and so, as Solow ([60], p.84) has
argued, “both factors are scarce.”27
4 Exploitation and profits
We begin our analysis by deriving some preliminary results concerning the properties of RS’s. Two
properties immediately follow from the monotonicity of φ. First, because at the solution to MP ν ,
ων(k+1)T = ω
ν
kT , all ν ∈ Nc, if (p,w) is a RS for EkT , then it is also a RS for E(k+1)T . Hence, we
can interpret (p,w) as a steady state solution and focus on E0 without loss of generality. Second,
at any RS, it must be pt > 0 and wt > 0, all t.
Then, it is immediate to show that at a RS for E0, in every period, constraints (1) and (2) are
binding for all capitalists.
Lemma 1: Let (p,w) be a RS for E0. Then, for all t:
(i) [pt (I −A)− wtL] yνt = ptcνt + ptsνt , all ν ∈ Nc;
(ii) if pt ≥ ptA+ wtL, then ptAyνt = ptωνt , all ν ∈ Nc.
Let the profit rate of sector i at t be denoted as πit =
[pt(I−A)−wtL]i
ptAi
. The next Lemma proves
that at a RS, in every period profits are non-negative and profit rates are equalized across sectors.
25Note that at a RS, if Nw > zt0 = Lyt0 for some t
0 then this does not necessarily imply wt0zt0 = Nwpt0b. If
wt0zt0 > Nwpt0b, then c
η
t0 ≥ b holds for all η ∈ Nw.
26To be precise, a RS should be denoted as

p,w, (ξν)
ν∈Nc , (ξ
η)
η∈Nw

. We write (p,w) for notational simplicity.
27Thus, capital scarcity as defined in Definition 2 encompasses Roemer’s [52] concept of a “capital limited” economy
but generalizes it. We are grateful to an anonymous referee for pointing out the latter concept.
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Lemma 2: Let (p,w) be a RS for E0. Then, at all t, πit = 0, for at least some i. Furthermore, if
either πit > 0, some i, or c
c
t + c
w
t + st > 0, then πit = πt, all i.
Proof. 1. Suppose that there is some t such that pit < ptAi + wtLi, all i. Then y
ν
it = 0, all i,
ν ∈ Nc, for all ξν that solve MP ν , and thus yt = 0. By Definition 1(v), this implies zηt = 0, all
η ∈ Nw, which violates Definition 1(ii).
2. Suppose that there is some t such that either πit > 0, some i, or c
c
t + c
w
t + st > 0, but
πlt < πjt, some j, l. Because wealth is used only to activate maximum profit rate processes, it
follows that for all ν ∈ Nc, yνlt = 0, for all ξν that solve MP ν , and thus ylt = 0. However, under
the hypotheses stated, Alyt + c
c
lt + c
w
lt + slt > 0, which contradicts Definition 1(iii).
By Lemma 2, at a SRS, πit = πt, all i and all t. More generally, at any RS such that πit = πt,
all i, we can consider price vectors such that pt = (1+ πt)ptA+wtL, all t. Furthermore, labor can
be chosen as the numéraire, setting wt = 1, all t, and in what follows we focus on RS’s of the form
(p,1), where 1 = (1, ..., 1)0.
Let λ = L(I − A)−1 be the 1 × n vector of Leontief employment multipliers, measuring the
amount of labor (directly and indirectly) necessary to produce goods. By the assumptions on A,
λ > 0 and throughout the paper we shall assume that the economy is sufficiently productive to
guarantee the reproduction of workers and be able to grow. Formally, λb < 1.
Let y =
PT−1
t=0 yt and c
w =
PT−1
t=0 c
w
t . Generalizing Roemer [51, 52], the amount of labor received
by workers at t is defined as the amount of labor embodied, or contained, in their consumption,
λcwt . Similarly, the amount of labor received by workers during their whole life is defined as λc
w.
Then, Roemer’s definition of UE exploitation can be extended to the intertemporal context.28
Definition 3: The within-period (WP) exploitation rate at t is et =
(Lyt−λcwt )
λcwt
and the whole-life
(WL) exploitation rate is e = (Ly−λc
w)
λcw
.
Both definitions convey potentially normatively relevant information and provide important
insights on the foundations of inequalities in capitalist economies. Nonetheless, below we shall
focus on the WP definition because it is more appropriate in the analysis of the relation between
inequality and growth, and of the evolution of exploitation over time.29
Theorem 1 proves the existence of a robust correspondence between UE exploitation and the
functional distribution of income. To discuss it, we introduce a reasonable restriction on the welfare
function φ.30
Assumption 1 (A1): All commodities are normal goods, and are gross complements to each
other.
Then, we have the following characterization.31
Theorem 1 Let (p,1) be a RS for E0 with πit = πt, all i and all t. Then (i) at all t, et > 0 if and
only if πt > 0. Furthermore, (ii) e > 0 if and only if πt > 0, some t. Finally, (iii) if the economy
E0 satisfies A1, then at each t, there is a monotone-increasing functional relationship π (et) = πt.
28With technical change, the definition of the WL exploitation rate would need to be adjusted accordingly.
29As argued in Veneziani [62], the WP approach is also more suitable to capture the structural features of exploita-
tive relations. It is worth reiterating, however, that a focus on the WP definition does not mean that WL exploitation
is normatively irrelevant. In our economy, the existence of WP exploitation implies WL exploitation, and the disap-
pearance of WP exploitation after a certain period does not make economic relations normatively unobjectionable.
We are grateful to an anonymous referee for raising this issue.
30An example of welfare function satisfying A1 is the Cobb-Douglas function.
31The proofs of all theorems are in Appendix A.
11
Theorem 1 proves that a correspondence exists between positive profits and the existence of UE
exploitation in general dynamic economies with intertemporally optimizing agents. From a norma-
tive perspective, Theorem 1 is important because it establishes a link between wealth inequalities,
the functional distribution of income, and exploitation: given private ownership of productive as-
sets, profits are a counterpart of the transfer of social surplus and social labor from asset-poor
agents to the wealthy. Equilibria in which a higher portion of social labor is transferred onto capi-
talists are also characterized by a functional distribution of income that is more favorable to them,
and vice versa.
However, because the rate of profit is one of the key determinants of investment decisions, and
of the long-run dynamics of capitalist economies, Theorem 1 can also be interpreted as providing a
link between exploitation and growth. In equilibrium, higher exploitation rates imply higher profit
rates which in turn imply more funds for capitalist accumulation. Further, by Theorem 1, it is
possible to show that there is no RS with persistent accumulation and persistent exploitation.
In fact, if et > 0, all t, then by Theorem 1 and Lemma 1(ii), and noting that pt > 0, at a
RS Lyt = LA
−1ωt, all t. By Definition 1(ii) and (v), it must therefore be LA−1ωt 5 Nw, all t.
Hence, if ωt+1 > ωt, all t, T − 1 > t = 0, then LA−1ωt < Nw, and the RS is constrained at all t,
T − 1 > t = 0. Therefore cηt = b, all η, and ptb = LA
−1ωt
Nw
, all t, T − 1 > t = 0. By Lemma 1(i), and
noting that pt > 0, at a RS (I−A)yt = st+cct+cwt , all t, which implies st = (I−A)A−1ωt−cct−cwt ,
all t, or by the previous arguments, ωt+1 = A
−1ωt − cct −Nwb, all t, T − 1 > t = 0.
Given the linearity ofMP ν , there is at most one period in which, for any ν ∈ Nc, at the solution
to MP ν , both savings and consumption are positive at a constrained RS with accumulation.32
Hence, given that capitalists are identical there is a period τ such that cct = 0, all t = τ , and
ωt+1 = A
−1ωt − Nwb, all t = τ , which implies ωt =
¡
A−1
¢t−τ
[ωτ − ωS] + ωS, all t = τ , where
ωS = NwA(I − A)−1b. Thus, by the productivity of A, given that workers’ subsistence requires
ωt = ωS , all t, if T is sufficiently big, labor demand exceeds supply after a finite number of periods,
driving πt and et to zero. This can be summarized as follows.
Proposition 1: For all T > 0, there is a T 0 > T such that there is no RS with ωt+1 > ωt, all t,
T 0 − 1 > t = 0, and et > 0, all t.
In other words, persistent accumulation and persistent exploitation and profits are inconsistent.
At a broad conceptual level, this conclusion echoes a classic argument by Kalecki [25], according to
which capitalists will tend to have negative attitudes towards policies that promote growth and full
employment. For Proposition 1 suggests that, absent any countervailing factors, capitalists will be
collectively concerned with any long-run sustained accumulation that may affect capital scarcity,
even though individually they may regard growth paths favorably.
The intuition behind Proposition 1 is simple. In our linear economy, if capitalists had a persis-
tent incentive to accumulate, this would yield a continual increase in the demand for labor which,
provided the time horizon is sufficiently long, would eventually exceed the fixed labor supply mak-
ing capital abundant and leading profits and exploitation to zero. It is important to note, however,
that Proposition 1 does not prove that there are growth paths in which profits and exploitation
disappear in equilibrium, because the anticipated fall in the profit rate might discourage rational
agents from investing.
In the next sections, we explore optimal behavior and the equilibrium dynamics of the economy.
5 Inequalities, Exploitation, and Time Preference
This section analyzes the dynamic foundations of exploitative relations, focusing on stationary
reproducible solutions. This is due to the theoretical relevance of SRS’s, as discussed in Veneziani
32This is proved rigorously below; see e.g. the analysis of MP ν in the proof of Theorem 4.
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[62], but also because they represent a benchmark solution whereby the labor market may clear at
all t. Lemma 3 provides a necessary condition for the existence of a SRS.
Lemma 3: Let (p,1) be a SRS for E0 with πt > 0, all t. Then β(1 + πt+1) = 1, all t.
Proof. 1. For all ν ∈ Nc, by Lemma 1, at any RS with πt > 0, all t, it must be ptcνt = πtptωνt −ptsνt ,
all t. At a SRS, the latter expression becomes ptc
ν = πtptω
ν
0, all t, ν, which implies c
ν ≥ 0.
2. Suppose, by way of contradiction, that β(1+πt0+1) > 1, some t
0 < T −1. Take any capitalist
ν ∈ Nc. Consider a one-period perturbation of ν’s optimal choice such that pt0dcνt0 = −pt0dsνt0 ,
pt0+1dc
ν
t0+1 = πt0+1pt0+1dω
ν
t0+1 − pt0+1dsνt0+1, dωνt0+1 = dsνt0 = −dsνt0+1.
3. Since φ is homothetic, cνt = c
ν implies that at a SRS, at all t it must be pt+1 = ktpt for some
kt > 0. Therefore consider dc
ν
t0 = ht0c
ν and dcνt0+1 = ht0+1c
ν for some ht0 , ht0+1 ≥ 0, and the one
period perturbation can be written as ht0pt0c
ν = −pt0dsνt0 and ht0+1pt0cν = πt0+1pt0dsνt0 + pt0dsνt0 .
4. By the homogeneity of φ it follows that φ
¡
cν + dcνt0
¢
+ βφ
¡
cν + dcνt0+1
¢
= (1 + ht0)φ (c
ν ) +
(1 + ht0+1)βφ (c
ν ) > φ (cν ) + βφ (cν ) if and only if ht0 + ht0+1β = [−1 + β (1 + πt0+1)] pt0pt0cν ds
ν
t0 >
0. Therefore, if β(1 + πt0+1) > 1, there is a sufficiently small ds
ν
t0 with pt0ds
ν
t0 > 0 such that
ht0 + ht0+1β > 0, a contradiction. A similar argument holds if β(1+ πt0+1) < 1, some t
0 < T − 1.
Intuitively, if β(1 + πt0+1) > 1, some t
0, then the cost (in terms of overall welfare) of reducing
consumption at t0 is lower than the benefit of saving, producing and consuming in t0 + 1, and vice
versa if β(1 + πt0+1) < 1. Only if β(1 + πt0+1) = 1 are costs and benefits equal.
Let 11+π be the Frobenius eigenvalue of A: by the assumptions on A, eπ > 0. Let πβ ≡ 1−ββ and
let pβ denote the solution of p = (1 + πβ)pA+ L: for all πβ ∈ [0, eπ), pβ is well defined and strictly
positive. By the homotheticity of φ, let cβ denote a vector identifying the optimal proportions of
the different consumption goods corresponding to pβ.
33 Theorem 2 analyzes MP ν .34
Theorem 2 (i) Let 1 > β > 11+π . If πt = πβ, all t, then for all ν ∈ Nc there is an optimal ξν such
that sνt = 0, all t, and C(ω
ν
0) = φ(cβ)(1 − βT ) pβω
ν
0
βpβcβ
. (ii) Let β 5 1. If πt = 0, all t, then for all
ν ∈ Nc there is an optimal ξν such that sνt = 0, all t, and C(ων0) = 0.
Consider a subset of the set of conceivable aggregate endowments of productive assets, namely
vectors of the form ω0 = γ0NwA(I − A)−1b, where γ0 is a positive real number capturing the
abundance of aggregate capital relative to the subsistence requirements of workers. If γ0 = 1, then
aggregate endowments are barely sufficient to guarantee the subsistence of all workers and it is not
difficult to show that the only RS for E0 requires πt = 0 and st = 0, all t.
Let π0 be defined by γ0λb = L[I−(1+π0)A]−1b: π0 is the profit rate such that a worker supplying
an amount of labor γ0λb can purchase the subsistence bundle b at prices p
0 = L[I − (1 + π0)A]−1.
Given Theorem 2, the next result proves the existence of a SRS.35
Theorem 3 Let ω0 = γ0NwA(I −A)−1b, γ0 > 1. Let π0 be defined by γ0λb = L[I − (1 + π0)A]−1b.
(i) Let γ0λb < 1. If β(1 + π
0) = 1 and cβ = kb for some k > 0, there is a SRS for E0 with
πt = π
0, all t;
(ii) Let γ0λb = 1. Let β ∈ [ 1(1+π0) , 1) be such that cβ = kb for some k > 0. Then there is a SRS
for E0 with πt = πβ, all t;
(iii) Let γ0λb 5 1. If β = 1, there is a SRS for E0 such that at all t, πt = 0 and ptAyνt = ptωνt ,
all ν ∈ Nc. Further, there is no SRS with πt > 0, some t.
33The vector cβ is determined up to a scalar transformation. If φ
0
i denotes the partial derivative of φ with respect
to the i−th entry, then φ
0
i(cβ)
φ0j(cβ)
=
piβ
pjβ
, for all i, j.
34 In the case with πt = 0, all t, Theorem 2 does not rule out the possibility that for some ν ∈ Nc, sνt 6= 0, for some
t, at the solution to MP ν . However, for all ν ∈ Nc at any ξν that solves MP ν , it must be λsνt = 0, all t.
35The restriction ω0 = γ0NwA(I − A)−1b is necessary given the linearity of MP ν and MP η. No theoretical
conclusion depends on this restriction, which in any case encompasses a rather large set of economies.
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Remark 1 By Lemma 3, Theorem 3(i)-(ii) identify the only class of SRS’s with πt > 0 all t.
Theorem 3 significantly strengthens and extends the results in Veneziani [62]. Consider economies
in which aggregate initial assets are above the minimum barely sufficient to guarantee workers’
subsistence (γ0 > 1), but below the level that would make aggregate labor demand higher than
aggregate labor supply (γ0λb 5 1). On the one hand, Theorem 3(i)-(ii) state that the dynamic
economy with maximizing agents displays persistent exploitation — and possibly persistent unem-
ployment, — if profits are consumed at all t and capitalists discount the future.36 On the other
hand, however, this result crucially depends on a strictly positive rate of time preference (Theorem
3(iii)): if capitalists do not discount the future, then there exists no stationary equilibrium with
positive profits. There exists, instead, a stationary equilibrium with no profit (and no exploitation)
in which capital is scarce in the sense of Definition 2. Further, if γ0λb = 1, the magnitude of
inequalities and exploitation will also depend on β.37
This suggests that Roemer’s [52, 53] claim that a differential distribution of (scarce) prop-
erty and competitive markets are sufficient institutions to generate persistent UE exploitation may
need to be at least qualified, and it is unclear that UE exploitation can be reduced to a focus on
asset inequalities. For Theorem 3 proves that, absent time preference, exploitation is not a persis-
tent feature of a competitive economy at a stationary RS, even if wealth inequalities endure and
capital remains scarce in the sense of Definition 2. An exclusive focus on the differential owner-
ship of (scarce) productive assets seems therefore insufficient to explain the origins of persistent
UE exploitation, and asset inequalities alone are not all that matters when evaluating capitalist
economies from a normative perspective. Something else is indispensable to generate persistent UE
exploitation, which is therefore normatively as important as asset inequalities themselves.
In the next section, we explore further the foundations of persistent UE exploitation, going
beyond the stationary equilibria considered in Theorem 3, and examine the relation between growth
and inequalities in the distribution of income, and in the exchange of labor.
6 Stable Growth and Distribution
In this section, in order to focus on the key theoretical issues and on macrodynamics, we consider
a special case of the n-good economies analyzed thus far by setting n = 1. The model and notation
remain the same, with obvious adaptations and letting φ be the identity function.38 Further, we
restrict our attention to the empirically relevant case of economies in which T can be arbitrarily
large but remains finite.
Sections 4-5 suggest that asset inequalities (and competitive markets) alone cannot fully explain
exploitative relations in dynamic capitalist economies. Persistent growth and exploitation are
inconsistent and even if the economy does not grow, persistent exploitation is possible only if β < 1.
This section explores further the relation between exploitation, time preference, and growth, by
focusing on stable growth paths in which the economy grows for a certain number of periods and
eventually reaches a steady state.39
36Observe that the proof of existence in cases (i) and (ii) of the theorem are premised on the condition that cβ = kb
for some k > 0. This condition on the agents’ optimal consumption bundle is due to the linearity of the model and
the presence of a subsistence constraint. None of our conclusions depend on this restriction, and the existence of a
SRS can be proved under more general assumptions although at a cost of a significant increase in technicalities.
37Theorems 2-3 also characterize inter-capitalist inequalities as a different phenomenon from exploitation. In fact,
at a SRS with πt =
1−β
β
> 0, all t, by Theorem 2 for any two capitalists ν and μ, C(ων0) > C(ω
μ
0 ) if and only if
pβω
ν
0 > pβω
μ
0 . Instead, if πt = 0, all t, then C(ω
ν
0) = 0, all ν.
38The main conclusions of this section can be extended to n-good economies, albeit at the cost of a significant
increase in technicalities. The key definitions and propositions are formulated so as to suggest the relevant n-good
extensions.
39The notion of stability here does not refer to the concept of asymptotic stability in dynamical systems. The
growth paths in Definition 4 are stable in the sense that the economy eventually reaches a stationary state. Observe
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Definition 4: A stable growth path (SGP) for E0 is a RS such that there is a period t
0 > 0 such
that ωt+1 = (1 + gt)ωt, gt > 0 , for all t < t
0, and ωt+1 = ωt, all t, T − 1 > t = t0.
For all t, let ωt = γtNwA(1 − A)−1b, so that any conditions on aggregate capital ωt can be
equivalently expressed as conditions on γt. Lemma 4 confirms the relevance of SRS’s as a theoretical
benchmark: only at a SRS can equilibrium in the labor market and exploitation exist at all t.
Lemma 4: If (p,1) is an unconstrained RS for E0 such that the economy exhibits capital scarcity
at t, then γtλb = 1.
Proof. At a RS with capital scarcity at t, it must be yt = A
−1ωt. Therefore, Lyt = γtNwλb, and
since the RS is unconstrained, Lyt = zt = Nw, which holds if and only if γtλb = 1.
In general, if a RS is unconstrained from t0 onwards, then γtλb = 1, all t = t0, and thus SRS’s
are a natural benchmark for all accumulation paths with persistent capital scarcity, which lead
to a stationary state with equilibrium in the labor market. Instead, if γtλb < 1, the economy is
constrained at t. Proposition 2 rules out paths where capital becomes abundant.
Proposition 2: Let ω0 = γ0NwA(1−A)−1b, γ0 > 1, and γ0λb 5 1. Suppose β < 1. Then there is
no RS such that there exists a period bt such that the economy exhibits capital scarcity at all t 5 bt
but LA−1ωt+1 > Nw.
Proof: 1. Suppose that there is a RS such that LA−1ωt 5 Nw but LA−1ωt+1 > Nw, some bt. Then
πt > 0 but πt+1 = 0 since capital is abundant at bt+ 1.
2. For all ν ∈ Nc, cνt = πtωνt − sνt and cνt+1 = −sνt+1 = 0. If sνt+1 < 0, some ν ∈ Nc, then since
β
¡
1 + πt+1¢ < 1, there is a feasible perturbation of the savings path with dsνt = −dsνt+1 < 0, which
increases ν’s welfare, contradicting optimality.
3. Let sνt+1 = 0, all ν ∈ Nc. Since st+1 = 0 then ωt+2 = ωt+1, so that πt+2 = 0 and
β
¡
1 + πt+2¢ < 1. Again, for all ν ∈ Nc, sνt+2 < 0 cannot be optimal. Therefore sνt+2 = 0, all
ν ∈ Nc, and πt+3 = 0; and so on.
4. By construction, ωt+1 > ω0. Hence, individual optimality impliesPT−1l=t+1 sνl < 0, all ν ∈ Nc,
which contradicts sνl = 0, for all ν ∈ Nc and all T − 1 = l = bt+ 1.
Proposition 2 shows that overaccumulation is not an equilibrium because the fall of the profit
rate to zero would rather lead capitalists to anticipate consumption, if β < 1. Thus, it confirms
the importance of time preference for the persistence of exploitation in Roemer’s theory: if β = 1,
overaccumulation and profits falling to zero are not ruled out.
Given Proposition 2, Theorem 4 characterizes stable growth paths.
Theorem 4 Let ω0 = γ0NwA(1−A)−1b and γ0 > 1. Let (p,1) be a SGP for E0 such that γtλb 5 1,
all t. At all t, define g0t =
[(γt−1)Nwb−cct ]π
γtNwb
. Then:
(i) ωt+1 = (1+ g
0
t)ωt, all t < t
0, and pt+1 = (1+ g0t)pt, all t < t0− 1. Furthermore, if β < 1 then
g0t = πt, all 0 < t < t0 − 1, while if β = 1 then g0t = πt, all t < t0 − 1.
(ii) If β < 1 and πt > 0, all t, T − 2 = t = t0, then β(1 + πt+1) = 1, all t, T − 2 = t = t0. If
β = 1, there is no t, T − 2 = t = t0, such that πt > 0 and πt+j > 0, some j > 0.
In other words, at any SGP, prior to t0, the economy accumulates at the maximal rate, which
coincides with the profit rate, and commodity prices grow at the same pace. As pt and the profit
rate increase, the growth rate of the economy is not constant over time. Except for period t = 0
the behavior of the economy in the first phase is the same regardless of whether agents discount
that if T = 2, then at any SGP the condition in the second part of Definition 4 is vacuously satisfied.
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the future or not (Theorem 4(i)). After t0, the economy is stationary: if β < 1 then the profit rate
is positive and equal to the value identified in Theorem 3(ii). If β = 1 then the only profit rate
consistent with a stationary path of capital after t0 is πt = 0 (Theorem 4(ii)).
At a general level, Theorem 4 provides a clear link between the growth rate and the profit
rate: profits are the engine of growth and to the extent that profitability, and the functional
distribution of income, are related to income inequalities, Theorem 4 suggests that inequalities are
indeed a necessary condition for economic growth in capitalist economies.40 Further, as in Classical
models, Theorem 4 establishes a negative relation between capitalist consumption and growth (for
a given workers’ subsistence bundle b), and g0t can be shown to coincide with the growth rate of
von Neumann-Sraffa models (e.g., von Neumann [66]; Kurz and Salvadori [30] p.102ff).
The next result characterizes capitalists’ optimal saving paths with accumulation.
Theorem 5 Let (p,1) be such that πt > πβ, all t 5 τ , and πt = πβ, all T − 1 = t = τ + 1,
for some τ , T − 1 = τ = 0. Then, for all ν ∈ Nc: (i) ωνt+1 = (1 + πt)ωνt , all t 5 τ − 1,
ωνt+1 = (1 + gt)ω
ν
t , all gt ∈ [0,πβ], all t, T − 2 = t = τ , and ωνT = ων0, is optimal, and (ii)
C(ων0) =
£
βτΠτi=0 (1 + πi)− βT−1
¤
ων0.
Let π0 be defined by 1 = L[1− (1 + π0)A]−1b: π0 is the profit rate such that a worker supplying
one unit of labor would be able to purchase the subsistence bundle b at prices p0 = L[1−(1+π0)A]−1.
Recall that by definition the maximum profit rate that can be obtained is given by eπ = 1−A
A
.
Let the sequence {γτ}T−1τ=0 be given by γ0 = 1λb and γτ+1 = (γτ+π)1+π : given λb < 1, the sequence is
monotonically decreasing and it defines a corresponding sequence of intervals [γτ+1, γτ ), for all τ .
By the productivity of A, the size of the intervals [γτ , γτ−1) decreases with τ and tends to zero, with
γτ → 1 as τ → ∞. The sequence of intervals [γτ+1, γτ ) identifies a partition of the theoretically
relevant set of aggregate productive endowments, given by the interval
¡
1, 1
λb
¤
.
Theorem 6 proves the existence of a SGP.
Theorem 6 Let β ∈ ( 1(1+π0) , 1], ω0 = γ0NwA(1 − A)−1b, and γ0 > 1. If γ0 ∈ [γτ+1, γτ ) and
γτ >
βπ
β(1+π)−1 , with τ = 1, then the vector (p,1) with πt = π(γt−1)γt , all t, τ = t = 0, with
γt+1 = (1 + πt)γt, all t 5 τ − 1, and πt = πβ, all t, T − 1 = t = τ + 1, is a SGP for E0 with
ωt+1 = (1 + πt)ωt, all t 5 τ − 1, ωτ+1 = (1 + gτ )ωτ , with gτ ∈ (0,πτ ], and ωt+1 = ωt, all t,
T − 1 = t = τ + 1.
By Theorem 6, if initial aggregate endowments are greater than the minimum amount necessary
to guarantee workers’ subsistence (γ0 > 1), then the existence of a SGP can be proved for a range
of values of the rate of time preference (β ∈ ( 1(1+π0) , 1]). In equilibrium, there exists a period τ
such that the economy accumulates and reaches the steady state in τ periods. The value of τ is
determined by the initial amount of aggregate capital: if aggregate endowments are such that γ0 ∈
[γτ+1, γτ ), then it takes τ periods for the economy to reach the steady state.
The dynamic path of the economy can thus be divided into two parts: in the first τ periods,
capital grows at the maximum rate, which coincides with the profit rate (γt+1 = (1 + πt)γt, or,
equivalently, ωt+1 = (1 + πt)ωt). By construction, if γ0 ∈ [γτ+1, γτ ), then γ1 ∈ [γτ , γτ−1), and so
on. In turn, in each period t, the profit rate, and therefore production prices, are determined by
aggregate endowments (πt =
π(γt−1)
γt
). Thus, as aggregate capital grows, profits and labor expended
increase over time. Yet, by construction γtλb < 1 for all periods t 5 τ −1, there is an excess supply
of labor, and workers’ consumption remains at the subsistence level.41
40Theorem 4 is reminiscent of the so-called Cambridge equation according to which gt = sπt since, at least in some
periods, the capitalists savings rate is equal to one and the growth rate is equal to the profit rate.
41Observe that in the first part of the SGP, the economy displays positive profits and accumulates at the maximal
rate even if γ0λb ≤ 1 and β = 1. This is consistent with Theorem 3(iii), which rules out positive profits (and
exploitation) at stationary equilibria if β = 1.
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Once the steady state is reached, however, full employment prevails (γtλb = 1), profits remain
constant at the value that makes capitalists indifferent between accumulating or decumulating
(πt = πβ), and workers’ consumption exceeds subsistence.
42 If β < 1, UE exploitation is a persistent
phenomenon; if β = 1, it disappears. By construction, in every period (both when the economy
accumulates, and at the steady state), all capitalists use up their entire wealth.
These results confirm the main conclusions of section 5. Only if β < 1 can overaccumulation
— leading to the disappearance of UE exploitation — be ruled out in equilibrium (Proposition 2).43
Moreover, if β = 1, inequalities, UE exploitation, and profits may well disappear after a finite
number of periods, both at a SRS (Theorem 3) and at a SGP (Theorem 4), even if capital remains
scarce in the sense of Definition 2. Instead, if agents discount the future, inequalities and UE
exploitation can be persistent even in paths with capital accumulation (Theorem 4). The crucial
role of time preference, as opposed, e.g., to capital scarcity, is further confirmed by the fact that
if β < 1, then the steady state value of the profit rate (and thus, by Theorem 1, the rate of UE
exploitation) is a positive function of β (Theorem 4(ii)).
These results suggest that the role of asset inequalities (and competitive markets) in generating
persistent inequalities and persistent UE exploitation in accumulating economies should be recon-
sidered. For asset inequalities are indeed necessary for the emergence of UE exploitation, but they
are not sufficient for its persistence, which raises some doubts on the claim that exploitation can
be reduced — either positively or normatively — to a purely distributive phenomenon (Roemer [54],
p.2).
One may object that Theorems 3 and 4 actually prove that time discounting by capitalists
is the missing ingredient necessary to guarantee the persistence of exploitation and inequalities,
including in economies that accumulate and eventually reach a steady state. From this perspective,
Theorem 3 and 4 can actually be seen as providing a dynamic generalization of Roemer’s theory:
provided agents discount the future, asset inequalities and competitive markets generate persistent
UE exploitation.
Although this interpretation is certainly legitimate, we are not convinced that an explanation
of persistent inequalities (in income and in the exchange of labor) that crucially relies on a strictly
positive rate of time preference is the most promising or theoretically satisfactory. Furthermore,
as argued in detail in Veneziani [62], if exploitation theory is understood as a distinctive approach
in normative economics, then the significance of a purely subjective factor such as time preference
is even less obvious both in general (see, for example, the classic analysis by Rawls [48]), and
specifically in the context of exploitation theory. At the very least, we would argue, it is worth
exploring alternative explanations, focusing on the structural features of capitalist economies.
In the rest of this section, we move a first step in this direction and consider the interaction
between technical change and labor market conditions and institutions in shaping distributive
outcomes and the equilibrium growth paths of capitalist economies.
To be specific, we consider the role of technical change and unemployment in creating the
conditions for inequalities and exploitation to persist. As Dosi et al ([15], p.164) have forcefully
noted, “Unemployment is a persistent and structural phenomenon of capitalist economies” of such
relevance that “other possible stylized facts are in comparison second order ones”. Theoretically, in
Marx, unemployment is seen as a structural feature of capitalism, whose role is to discipline workers
and to restrain wages from rising and, in turn, labor-saving technical change plays a key role in
guaranteeing the persistence of a reserve army of the unemployed by increasing labor productivity.
In our model, the disappearance of exploitation derives from an initial excess supply of labor
which is rapidly absorbed owing to accumulation. The introduction of labor saving technical
progress should avoid this: by increasing labor productivity, technical progress may allow labor
42Given γ0 > 1, this follows from the assumption that β >
1
(1+π0) , which implies that pβb < 1 and therefore workers
can consume above subsistence.
43Thus, Devine and Dymsky’s [14] result can only be an equilibrium if β = 1.
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supply to be persistently higher than labor demand.44
To be specific, we take “the Schumpeterian view that the creation of new ideas largely occurs
at an autonomous rate” (Shell [58], p.67) and assume that the amount of labor directly needed in
production declines geometrically over time.45
Assumption 2 (A2): At all t, Lt+1 = δLt, δ ∈ (0, 1), with L0 > 0 given.
Under (A2), all the results in Section 4 hold, once Lt is substituted for L. Then, Theorem 7
provides sufficient conditions for the existence of a RS with persistent exploitation.
Theorem 7 Assume (A2). Let ω0 = γ0NwA(1−A)−1b, γ0 > 1, and γ0λ0b 5 1. Let δ(1+ eπ) 5 1
and β[1 + π(γ0−1)
γ0
] = 1. The price vector (p,1) with π0 = π(γ0−1)γ0 and πt+1 = πt(1+π)(1+πt) , all t,
T −2 = t = 0, is a RS for E0 with Ltyt < Nw, all t > 0, and ωt+1 = (1+πt)ωt, all t, T −2 = t = 0.
Theorem 7 provides a complete characterization of dynamic general equilibrium paths with
sustained growth and persistent — indeed, increasing — UE exploitation and inequality. Consider
economies with aggregate initial assets above the minimum barely sufficient to guarantee workers’
subsistence (γ0 > 1), but below the level that would make aggregate labor demand higher than
aggregate labor supply (γ0λ0b 5 1). If technical change is strong enough (δ(1+ eπ) 5 1) and agents
are not too impatient (β[1 + π(γ0−1)
γ0
] = 1) then there exists an equilibrium with positive — indeed,
increasing — profits, and by Theorem 1, UE exploitation in every period, as γ0 > 1 implies π0 > 0
and eπ > πt, all t, implies πt+1 > πt, all t. Along the equilibrium path, the economy grows at the
maximal rate, πt, but labor demand remains lower than labor supply (Ltyt < Nw).
Theorem 7 highlights an interesting mechanism that may contribute to the persistence of ex-
ploitation and inequalities in capitalist economies. For it shows that labor-saving technical progress
allows the economy to settle on a “golden rule” growth path with persistent exploitation even if
β = 1. The increase in labor productivity — a long run historical tendency of capitalist economies
(Acemoglu [1]) — ensures that labor remains in excess supply even along a growth path with maxi-
mal accumulation, thus countering all tendencies for profits and exploitation to disappear. Indeed,
as the nominal wage rate is normalized to one and employment Ltyt either does not grow, or grows
more slowly than national income pt(1−A)yt, Theorem 7 implies that the wage share in national
income, Ltyt
pt(1−A)yt , tends to fall steadily over time tending to zero in the long run as in Mookherjee
and Ray [36].
7 Conclusion
In this paper, an intertemporal model with heterogeneous optimizing agents is set up to analyze
the relation between inequalities — in income, wealth and labor exchanged, — and accumulation.
We have argued that the concept of exploitation as the unequal exchange of labor is well defined,
and it can be interpreted as capturing normatively relevant inequalities in well-being freedom. We
have generalized the well-known correspondence between the existence of exploitation and positive
profits to the dynamic economy. This provides a link between exploitation and the functional
income distribution, but it also suggests that inequalities (both in wealth holdings and in the
exchange of labor) are necessary for accumulation in capitalist economies.
44The relevance of exogenous growth in the labor force, heterogeneous preferences, and/or labor-saving technical
progress in making exploitation persistent is stressed by Skillman [59]. Observe that, for the sake of simplicity, and
without significant loss of generality we do not assume that technical change is capital using, in addition to being
labor saving, and thus the capital coefficient A remains constant.
45 In other words, we are considering technology as “stemming from advances in science or from the behavior of
entrepreneurs driven by a variety of nonprofit motives” (Acemoglu [2], p.11). This is just to focus on one key channel
through which technical change affects distributive outcomes and growth, namely by preserving capital scarcity. We
discuss more complex interactions between technical change and distributive conflict in the concluding section.
18
We have also explored the mechanisms underlying the persistence of inequalities and exploita-
tion in accumulating economies, and the relation between asset inequalities and exploitation. We
have shown that asset inequalities are a fundamental feature of capitalist economies, and a key de-
terminant of its long-run dynamics, but contrary to Roemer’s [52, 54] seminal theory, it is unclear
that exploitation can be reduced to wealth inequalities. For, differential ownership of productive
assets is necessary for the emergence of exploitation but it is not sufficient for it to persist in
equilibrium, even if capital does not become abundant.
Our analysis thus suggests a more complex role for asset inequalities in generating persistent UE
exploitation and inequalities. The relevance of wealth inequalities, we believe, is best understood
in conjunction with the asymmetric relations of power that characterize capitalist economies, the
mechanisms that ensure the scarcity of capital, and the structural constraints that the differential
ownership of productive assets imposes on aggregate investment, technical change, unemployment,
and so on. From this perspective, Theorem 7 is the most promising result. For, the analysis of
the economy with technical progress highlights a mechanism that may contribute to explain the
persistence of UE exploitation and inequalities. In the long-run labor-saving technical progress
tends to reduce the demand for labor, thus creating the conditions for an excess supply of labor,
which restrains wages from rising, which in turn allows UE exploitation and inequalities to persist.
To be sure, Theorem 7 incorporates a rather simple mechanism through which exploitation
and inequalities are reproduced over time, namely exogenous, labor-saving technical progress. One
promising line for further research, from this perspective, would be the analysis of the endoge-
nous competitive processes leading capitalists to introduce new cost-reducing techniques in general
economies. As Bidard [12] has shown, in the multi-sectoral linear production model the adoption
of cost-reducing technical change would involve a rather complex process under capitalist compe-
tition, which cannot be fully captured in the one-sector model in section 6. Further, Yoshihara
and Veneziani [68] have recently proved that some types of cost-reducing technical change do not
allow exploitation to persist. Another promising line for further research in this vein would be the
introduction of endogenous R&D investment, as in the literature on directed technical change (see
Kennedy [28] and, more recently, Acemoglu [1, 3]). One aspect of these strands of literature that is
particularly congenial to our research agenda is the explicit relation between the functional income
distribution and innovations, and the role of technical change in distributive conflicts.46
Another interesting extension of our analysis would be the construction of an index of the in-
tensity of exploitation at the individual level, measuring the discrepancy between labor contributed
and labor received by each agent, and then analyze the dynamics of the distribution of the exploita-
tion intensity index over time, as the economy accumulates. Given that our concept of exploitation
is based on empirically measurable magnitudes (labor expended, technology, income, and consump-
tion), this approach might yield novel insights on the relation between inequality and growth. We
leave these issues for further research.
A Proofs of the Main Theorems
Proof of Theorem 1:
Proof. Part (i). Consider any t. By Definition 1(ii) and (v), at a RS Lyt = zt = ptc
w
t . Then,
noting that cwt > 0, by Lemma 2, Lyt > λc
w
t if and only if πt > 0.
Part (ii). The result follows from part (i), since Lyt − λcwt = 0, all t.
Part (iii). Let (p, 1) be a RS for E0 with πt > 0. For this πt > 0, the equilibrium price vector
pt > 0 is uniquely determined by pt ≡ L (I − (1 + πt)A)−1. Correspondingly, the aggregate demand
vector cwt > 0 is also uniquely determined. As argued in part (i), we observe that Lyt = ptc
w
t at
the RS. Moreover, Lyt = LA
−1 ωt by Lemma 1. Given ωt > 0, let (p0t, 1) be an equilibrium
46We are grateful to an anonymous referee for this suggestion.
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price associated with π0t > 0, such that the associated yt, cc0t , cw0t , and s0t satisfy the conditions of
Definition 1. Then, again LA−1ωt = p0tcw0t holds. Therefore, by Definition 3, the corresponding
exploitation rate is uniquely determined by e0t =
p0tcw0t
λcw0t
− 1.
To show the monotone increasing relationship of π (et) = πt at period t, we need to verify that
πt T π0t if and only if et T e0t. Let π0t > πt. Then, it implies p0t ≡ L (I − (1 + π0t)A)−1 > pt. Then,
given that ptc
w
t = LA
−1ωt = p0tcw0t , p0t > pt implies cw0t ≤ cwt by (A1). Therefore, λcw0t < λcwt holds,
which implies that e0t > et. Conversely, to show that e0t > et implies π0t > πt, assume π0t 5 πt. If
π0t < πt, then et < e0t holds, as argued for the case of π0t > πt. Therefore, let π0t = πt. Then, it
implies that p0t = L (I − (1 + πt)A)−1 = pt, and so cw0t = cwt . Thus, et = e0t holds, as λcw0t = λcwt
holds. In summary, we can find a monotone increasing function π (et) = πt.
Proof of Theorem 2:
Proof. Part (i). Write MP ν using dynamic recursive optimization theory. Let W ⊆ Rn+ be the
state space with generic element ω. For any (p, 1), let Ψ :W →W be the feasibility correspondence:
Ψ(ωνt ) =
©
ωνt+1 ∈W : ptωνt+1 5 (1 + πt) ptωνt
ª
. Let
Π(ων0) =
©
ων : ωνt+1 ∈ Ψ(ωνt ), all t,ωνT = ων0, and ων0 given
ª
.
Let Φ =
©¡
ωνt ,ω
ν
t+1
¢ ∈W ×W : ωνt+1 ∈ Ψ(ωνt )ª be the graph of Ψ. By the homogeneity of φ,
if πt = πβ, all t, then the one-period return function F : Φ → R+ at t is F
¡
ωνt ,ω
ν
t+1
¢
=
φ(cβ)[(1+πβ)pβωνt−pβωνt+1]
pβcβ
. Then, MP ν can be written as
C(ων0) = max
ων∈Π(ων0)
T−1X
t=0
βt
φ(cβ)[(1 + πβ) pβω
ν
t − pβωνt+1]
pβcβ
.
Since Ψ(ωνt ) 6= ∅, all ωνt ∈W, and F is continuous, concave, and bounded below by 0, MP ν is
well defined.
2. By construction, (1 + πβ)β = 1 and MP
ν reduces to
C(ων0) = max
ων∈Π(ων0)
φ(cβ)
∙
(1 + πβ)pβω
ν
0
pβcβ
− βT−1 pβω
ν
T
pβcβ
¸
.
Therefore, any ων ∈ Π(ων0) such that ωνT = ων0 is optimal and C(ων0) follows by noting that
β < 1.
Part (ii). The result follows from MP ν , given that ωνT = ων0.
Proof of Theorem 3:
Proof. Part (i). 1. (Optimal ξν .) By the Perron-Frobenius theorem π0 exists and π0 ∈ (0, eπ).
(The possibility that π0 = 0 is ruled out by the condition γ0λb = L[I− (1+π0)A]−1b given γ0 > 1.)
If π0 = πβ, cβ = kb, some k > 0, and πt = π0, all t, by Theorem 2, any ξν such that sνt = 0,
pβAy
ν
t = pβω
ν
0, and c
ν
t = h
ν
t b with h
ν
t =
π0pβων0
pβb
, all t, solves MP ν , for all ν ∈ Nc.
2. (Capital market.) Hence, it is possible to choose (yν)ν∈Nc such that at all t, pβAy
ν
t = pβω
ν
0 ,
all ν, and yt = A
−1ω0.
3. (Labor market and optimal ξη.) Since Lyt = γ0λbNw < Nw, all t, for all η ∈ Nw assign
actions z
η
t = bzηt = γ0λb, all t; then by construction γ0λb = pβb, and thus cηt = b, all t. Hence, these
actions solve MP η for all η, with Lyt = zt, all t.
4. (Final goods market.) Definition 1(iii) is satisfied because, at all t: (I − A)yt = γ0Nwb,
cwt = Nwb, and c
c
t = h
c
tb, where h
c
t =
P
ν∈Nc h
ν
t , and so h
c
tpβb = γ0Nw[pβ−λ]b, or hct = Nw(γ0−1).
Part (ii). 1. (Optimal ξν .) By the Perron-Frobenius theorem π0 exists and π0 ∈ (0, eπ). Thus
πβ ∈ (0, eπ). If πt = πβ, all t, by Theorem 2, any ξν such that sνt = 0, pβAyνt = pβων0, and cνt = hνt b
with hνt pβb = πβpβω
ν
0 , all t, solves MP
ν , for all ν ∈ Nc.
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2. (Capital market.) Hence, it is possible to choose (yν)ν∈Nc such that at all t, pβAy
ν
t = pβω
ν
0 ,
all ν, and yt = A
−1ω0.
3. (Labor market; optimal ξη.) Since Lyt = Nw, all t, assign actions z
η
t = bzηt = 1 and cηt = hηt b
with h
η
t = 1/pβb, all t, to all η ∈ Nw. Since πβ ∈ (0,π0] then 1/λb > hηt = 1, all t, η. Hence, these
actions solve MP η for all η, with Lyt = zt, all t.
4. (Final goods market.) Definition 1(ii) is met because, at all t, (I−A)yt = γ0Nwb while cwt =
Nwb/pβb and c
c
t =
P
ν∈Nc h
ν
t b, where
P
ν∈Nc h
ν
t pβb = πβpβω0, or
P
ν∈Nc h
ν
t pβb = γ0Nw[pβ − λ]b.
Part (iii). 1. If γ0λb = 1, existence is proved as in part (ii) with z
η
t = bzηt = 1 and hηt = 1/λb,
all η ∈ Nw, and all t. If γ0λb < 1, existence is proved as in part (i) with yt = (1/γ0)A−1ω0 and
Lyt = λbNw, all t, z
η
t = bzηt = λb and cηt = b, all η ∈ Nw, and all t. In both cases, as shown in parts
(i) and (ii), ptAy
ν
t = ptω
ν
t , at all t and for all ν ∈ Nc.
2. Suppose, by contradiction, that there is a SRS with πt > 0, some t. Then, using the same
perturbational argument as in the proof of Lemma 3, it is immediate to prove that it must be
πt−1 = πt+1 = 0 (observe that since β = 1, πt+1 > 0 implies β (1 + πt+1) > 1). Therefore noting
that pt = (1 + πt)ptA + wtL, and wt = 1 all t, it follows that pt−1 = pt+1 = λ > 0, for any
0 5 t − 1 < t + 1 5 T − 1. Then, for all ν ∈ Nc, there is no optimal ξν such that sνt = 0 and
cνt−1 = cνt+1 = cνt , a contradiction.
Proof of Theorem 4:
Proof. Part (ii). 1. Consider capitalist ν’s program MP ν recursively: at all t, the functional
equation is Ct(ω
ν
t ) = max
ωνt+1∈Ψ(ωνt )
[(1 + πt)ω
ν
t − ωνt+1] + βCt+1(ωνt+1). At T − 1, since CT (ωνT ) = 0 for
all ωνT , optimality requires ω
ν
T = ω
ν
0 and CT−1(ωνT−1) = [(1+πT−1)ω
ν
T−1−ων0 ]. Therefore at T −2,
CT−2(ωνT−2) = max
ων
T−1∈Ψ(ωνT−2)
[(1 + πT−2)ωνT−2 − ωνT−1] + βCT−1(ωνT−1).
2. Suppose β < 1 and πt > 0, all t, T − 2 = t = t0. Because πT−2 > 0, if β(1 + πT−1) 6= 1
then ωνT−1 6= ωνT−2, all ν ∈ Nc, and ωT−1 6= ωT−2. Hence, β(1 + πT−1) = 1 and CT−2(ωνT−2) =£
(1 + πT−2)ωνT−2 − βων0
¤
. Iterating backwards, if ωt+1 = ωt, all t, T−2 = t = t0, then β(1+πt+1) =
1, all t, T − 2 = t = t0, which implies Ct0(ωνt0) =
h
(1 + πt0)ω
ν
t0 − βT−1−t
0
ων0
i
.
3. Suppose β = 1. Suppose, contrary to the statement, that πt > 0 and πt+j > 0, some t,
T − 2 = t = t0, and j > 0. Since πt > 0, then cνt = 0, all ν ∈ Nc, is not possible, or else ωt+1 6= ωt,
and since πt+j > 0 then (1 + πt+j) > 1, and there is a feasible perturbation ds
ν
t = −dsνt+j > 0,
with dsνl = 0 all l 6= t, t+ j, that increases ν’s welfare, contradicting optimality.
Part (i). 1. Suppose that (p, 1) is a SGP for E0. Then by definition there is a t
0 > 0 and
a sequence {gt}t0−2t=0 such that ωt+1 = (1 + gt)ωt, gt > 0, all t, 0 5 t < t0 − 1. For all ν ∈ Nc,
cνt = πtω
ν
t − sνt , all t. Therefore, summing over ν and noting that by definition st = gtωt, all t, it
follows that cct = (πt − gt)ωt, all t. Since ωt = γtNwA(1−A)−1b, all t, and noting that in the one
good case eπ = 1−A
A
, then cct = (πt − gt)γtNwbπ , all t, or gt = [πt − ( cctπγtNwb)], all t.
2. By definition, (pt−λ) = πtptA(1−A)−1, all t, or equivalently πt = eπ(pt−λ)/pt, all t. Hence,
gt = [
(pt−λ)
pt
− ( cct
γtNwb
)]eπ, all t. Moreover, observe that at a SGP with LA−1ωt = γtNwλb 5 Nw,
all t, it must be γtλb < 1, all t 5 t0 − 1. By construction, this implies that at all t 5 t0 − 1,
z
η
t = γtλb = ptb, for all η ∈ Nw. Therefore pt = γtλ, all t 5 t0 − 1, and the first part of
the statement follows substituting the latter expression into the equation for gt, and noting that
pt+1
pt
=
γt+1
γt
= ωt+1
ωt
, for all t < t0 − 1.
3. Suppose β < 1. If t0 5 2, then the statement holds vacuously. Hence, assume t0 > 2. At
t = t0− 1, Ct0−1(ωνt0−1) = max
ων
t0∈Ψ(ωνt0−1)
[(1 + πt0−1)ωνt0−1−ωνt0 ] + βCt0(ωνt0), where Ct0(ωνt0) is as in step
2 of the proof of part (ii) for all ν ∈ Nc. Hence, at a SGP β(1+πt0) = 1, or else ωνt0 = 0, all ν ∈ Nc.
If β(1 + πt0) > 1, then ω
ν
t0 = (1 + πt0−1)ω
ν
t0−1, all ν, and gt0−1 = πt0−1. If β(1 + πt0) = 1, then gt0−1
is undetermined. In either case, Ct0−1(ωνt0−1) =
h
β(1 + πt0)(1 + πt0−1)ωνt0−1 − βT−t
0
ων0
i
, all ν ∈ Nc.
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4. Consider t = t0− 2. Again, at a SGP, it must be β2(1+πt0)(1+ πt0−1) = 1, and Ct0−2(ωνt0−2)
=
h
β2(1 + πt0)(1 + πt0−1)(1 + πt0−2)ωνt0−2 − βT−t
0+1ων0
i
, all ν ∈ Nc. If β2(1 + πt0)(1 + πt0−1) = 1,
then by the previous step β(1 + πt0−1) 5 1: but then since by step 2 at a SGP pt+1 > pt, all
t < t0 − 1, by definition it follows that β(1 + πt0−2) < 1. However, because t0 > 2, by considering
Ct0−3(ωνt0−3), it immediately follows that ω
ν
t0−2 = 0, all ν ∈ Nc, violating the definition of SGP.
Therefore, it must be β2(1 + πt0)(1 + πt0−1) > 1, ωνt0−1 = (1 + πt0−2)ω
ν
t0−2, all ν, and gt0−2 = πt0−2.
This argument can be iterated backwards for all t, 0 < t < t0 − 1, showing that ωνt+1 = (1 + πt)ωνt ,
all ν, and all t, 0 < t < t0 − 1, and thus gt = πt, all t, 0 < t < t0 − 1.
5. Suppose β = 1. A similar argument as in steps 3 and 4 applies noting that at all t 5 t0 − 1,
πt > 0 implies β(1 + πt) > 1, given part (ii).
Proof of Theorem 5:
Proof. 1. Take any ν ∈ Nc. ConsiderMP ν recursively. At T −1, since CT (ωνT ) = 0, then ωνT = ων0
is optimal and CT−1(ωνT−1) = [(1 + πT−1)ω
ν
T−1 − ων0]. At T − 2, CT−2(ωνT−2) = max
ων
T−1∈Ψ(ωνT−2)
[(1 +
πT−2)ωνT−2 − ωνT−1 + βCT−1(ωνT−1)]. Hence, if πT−1 = πβ then any ωνT−1 = ωνT−2 is optimal and
CT−2(ωνT−2) = [(1 + πT−2)ω
ν
T−2 − βων0]. Iterating backwards, if πt = πβ, all t, T − 1 = t = τ + 1,
then at all t, T − 2 = t = τ , any ωνt+1 = ωνt is optimal and Cτ (ωντ ) = [(1 + πτ )ωντ − βT−τ−1ων0]. If
τ = 0, the result is proved, noting that C(ων0) = C0(ω
ν
0).
2. If τ > 0, consider τ −1. Since Cτ−1(ωντ−1) = max
ωντ∈Ψ(ωντ−1)
[(1+πτ−1)ωντ−1−ωντ +βCτ (ωντ )] and
πt > πβ, at the solution toMP
ν , ωντ = (1+πτ−1)ωντ−1 and Cτ−1(ωντ−1) = [β(1+πτ )(1+πτ−1)ωντ−1−
βT−των0]. Iterating backwards, if πt > πβ, all t 5 τ , at the solution to MP ν , ωνt+1 = (1+πt)ωνt , all
t 5 τ − 1, and the expression for C(ων0) = C0(ων0) follows.
Proof of Theorem 6:
Proof. 1. We begin by establishing three properties of the sequence {γt}T−1t=0 .
1.1. At all t 5 τ , if γt ∈ [γτ+1−t, γτ−t) and πt = eπ (γt−1)γt , then γt+1 = (1 + πt)γt implies
γt+1 ∈ [γτ−t, γτ−t−1). To see this, note that at all τ , γτ = (1+ eπ)γτ+1− eπ, while γt+1 = (1+πt)γt
and πt = eπ (γt−1)γt implies γt+1 = (1 + eπ (γt−1)γt )γt = (1 + eπ)γt − eπ.
1.2. If γt ∈ [γ1, γ0) = [γ1, 1λb) and πt = eπ (γt−1)γt , then there is a gt ∈ (0,πt] such that γt+1 =
(1+ gt)γt implies γt+1 = 1/λb. To see this, note that, as in step 1.1, γ0 = (1+ eπ)γ1− eπ. Therefore
if γt = γ1 and πt = eπ (γt−1)γt , then gt = πt implies γt+1 = γ0, and for all γt ∈ (γ1, γ0), gt = πt
implies γt+1 > γ0, while gt = 0 implies γt+1 < γ0.
1.3. If γτ >
βπ
β(1+π)−1 , all τ = 1, then π1 = eπ (γ1−1)γ1 > πβ, for all γ1 ∈ [γτ , γτ−1). To see this,
note that if γ1 = γτ then π1 = eπ ³1− 1γτ ´ > eπ ³1− β(1+π)−1βπ ´ = πβ, and π1 is strictly increasing
in γ1.
2. Consider (p, 1) with πt = eπ (γt−1)γt , all t 5 τ , where γt+1 = (1 + πt)γt, all t 5 τ − 1. Then
π0 = eπ (γ0−1)γ0 and πt+1 = eπ ³1− 1(1+πt)γt´, and (p, 1) is well defined.
3. (Optimal ξν ; reproducibility.) By step 1.3, and noting that γ0 > 1, under the assumptions
of the Theorem, we have πt > πβ, all t 5 τ . Hence, by Theorem 5, ωνt+1 = (1 + πt)ωνt , all
t 5 τ − 1, ωνt+1 = (1 + gt)ωνt , with gt ∈ [0,πt], all t, T − 1 = t = τ , and ωνT = ων0 is optimal for all
ν ∈ Nc. Therefore, for all ν ∈ Nc, we can choose an optimal ξν such that ωνt+1 = (1 + πt)ωνt , all
t 5 τ − 1, ωντ+1 = (1 + gτ )ωντ , with gτ =
³
1
γτλb
− 1
´
∈ (0,πτ ], ωνt = ωντ+1, all t, T − 1 = t = τ + 1,
ωνT = ω
ν
0; y
ν
t = A
−1ωνt , all t; and cνt = (1 + πt)ωνt − ωνt+1, all t. (Observe that by steps 1.1 and 1.2,
gτ =
³
1
γτλb
− 1
´
∈ (0,πτ ] exists and γτ+1 = γ0.) Hence, parts (i) and (vi) of Definition 1 are met.
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4. (Capital market.) Because yνt = A
−1ωνt , all t and all ν ∈ Nc, then yt = A−1ωt, all t, and
Definition 1(iv) is satisfied.
5. (Labor market; optimal ξη.) By construction, γ0 < γ1 < γ0 =
1
λb
and therefore Ly0 =
LA−1ω0 = γ0λbNw < Nw. By step 3, together with steps 1.1 and 1.2, it follows that γt < γ0 = 1λb
for all t 5 τ , and γt = γ0 = 1λb for all t, T − 1 = t = τ + 1. Therefore Lyt = LA−1ωt < Nw, all
t 5 τ , whereas Lyt = LA−1ωt = Nw, all t, T −1 = t = τ +1. Hence, for all η ∈ Nw, assign a vector
ξη such that z
η
t = bzηt = γtλb and cηt = b, all t 5 τ , and zηt = 1 and cηt = 1pβ , all t, T − 1 = t = τ +1.
Noting that pβ = L [1− (1 + πβ)A]−1 and πβ > π0 imply 1pβ > b, it follows that ξ
η solves MP η, for
all η ∈ Nw. Hence parts (ii) and (v) of Definition 1 are met.
6. (Final goods market.) Consider first all periods t 5 τ . By construction at all t, t 5 τ , cηt = b,
all η ∈ Nw, and cνt + sνt = πtωνt , all ν ∈ Nc. Therefore cct + st + cwt = πtωt +Nwb, and substituting
for πt = eπ (γt−1)γt = 1−AA (γt−1)γt and ωt = γtNwA(1 − A)−1b, one obtains cct + st + cwt = γtNwb.
Because (1− A)yt = (1− A)A−1ωt = γtNwb, it follows that (1− A)yt = cct + st + cwt , all t, t 5 τ .
Consider next periods t, T − 1 = t = τ +1. By construction, at all t, T − 1 = t = τ +1, cηt = 1/pβ,
all η ∈ Nw, and cνt + sνt = πβωνt , all ν ∈ Nc, and so cct + st + cwt = πβωt + Nwpβ . By substituting for
πβ and pβ, and noting that at the proposed path γt = 1/λb, one obtains c
c
t + st + c
w
t = Nwb/λb.
Because (1−A)yt = (1−A)A−1ωt = γtNwb = Nwb/λb, it follows that (1−A)yt = cct + st + cwt , all
t = τ + 1. Therefore, Definition 1(iii) is met.
Proof of Theorem 7:
Proof. 1. Consider the sequence of profit rates {πt}T−1t=0 . Since γ0 > 1, π0 ∈ (0, eπ). Moreover, at
all t, πt < eπ implies πt+1 > πt. Therefore given β h1 + eπ (γ0−1)γ0 i = β (1 + π0) = 1, it follows that
πt > πβ, all t > 0. Finally, we prove that if π0 = eπ (γ0−1)γ0 , πt+1 = πt(1+π)(1+πt) , all t, T − 2 = t = 0, and
γt+1 = (1 + πt)γt, all t, T − 2 = t = 0, then πt = eπ (γt−1)γt , all t > 0. To see this, suppose the result
holds for any t > 0. Then πt+1 =
πt(1+π)
(1+πt)
and γt+1 = (1 + πt)γt imply πt+1 =
πtγt(1+π)
γt+1
. Because
πt = eπ (γt−1)γt , the latter expression becomes πt+1 = π(γt−1)(1+π)γt+1 , and the desired result follows
noting that γt+1 = (1 + πt)γt and πt = eπ (γt−1)γt imply γt+1 − 1 = (1 + eπ) (γt − 1), as required.
2. (Optimal ξν ; reproducibility.) By step 1, πt > πβ, all t > 0. Therefore, by Theorem 5, for
all ν ∈ Nc, the vector ξν with yνt = A−1ωνt , all t; ωνt+1 = (1+πt)ωνt and cνt = 0, all t, T −2 = t = 0;
ωνT = ω
ν
0; and c
ν
T−1 = (1 + πT−1)ω
ν
T−1 − ων0 solves MP ν . Hence parts (i) and (vi) of Definition 1
are met.
3. (Capital market) Because yνt = A
−1ωνt , all t and all ν ∈ Nc, then yt = A−1ωt, all t, and
Definition 1(iv) is satisfied.
4. (Labor market; optimal ξη) By step 3, Ltyt = LtA
−1ωt = γtλtbNw, all t. By (A2), Lt+1 =
δLt, all t, T − 2 = t = 0, and by step 3 yt+1 = yt(1 + πt), all t, T − 2 = t = 0. Hence,
Lt+1yt+1 = δ(1+ πt)Ltyt, all t, T − 2 = t = 0. Therefore, since L0y0 = L0A−1ω0 = γ0λ0bNw 5 Nw
and δ(1+ eπ) 5 1 by assumption, and πt < eπ, all t, it follows that Ltyt 5 Nw, all t, and Ltyt < Nw,
all t > 0. Then, for all η ∈ Nw, let ξη be defined by zηt = bzηt = γtλtb and cηt = b, all t. Noting
that γtλtb 5 1, all t, and pt = Lt [1− (1 + πt)A]−1 = Lt
h
1−
³
1 + 1−A
A
(γt−1)
γt
´
A
i−1
= γtλt, all t,
it follows that ξη solves MP η, all η ∈ Nw. Therefore parts (ii) and (v) of Definition 1 are met.
5. (Final goods market) At the proposed path, cwt = Nwb and c
c
t + st = πtωt, all t, and
substituting for πt = eπ (γt−1)γt = 1−AA (γt−1)γt and ωt = γtNwA(1−A)−1b, one obtains cct + st + cwt =
γtNwb, all t. Because (1−A)yt = (1−A)A−1ωt = γtNwb, all t, Definition 1(iii) is satisfied.
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